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A. INTRODUCTION
1. At its Berlin session in 1999, the Institute established a new
Commission (l7th Commission) for the study of the topic:
Universal Criminal Jurisdiction With Respect to the Crime of
Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes.
Originally, it was decided that our confrère Theodor Meron
should assume the rapporteurship of this Commission. However,
after his election as a judge of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, for obvious reasons of incompatibility
he had to renounce his function as Rapporteur. To replace him,
the present Rapporteur was appointed.
2. The Institute has not yet dealt with universal jurisdiction in
criminal matters to the wide extent as now suggested by the man-
date imparted to the 17th Commission. In the Manuel des lois de
la guerre sur terre, adopted at its Oxford session in 1880, it in-
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cluded a special part –of a very summary nature– on «penal sanc-
tions» (Part Three, Articles 84-86). However, only the first one of
these articles lays down provisions on punishment concerning in-
dividuals, whereas the remaining two articles have as their object
reprisals, in modern terminology countermeasures. In the intro-
ductory chapeau of this Part of the Manuel, it is stated:
Si des infractions aux règles qui précèdent ont été commises, les
coupables doivent être punis, après jugement contradictoire, par celui
des belligérants au pouvoir duquel ils se trouvent.
In other words, the Institute did not take into account the even-
tuality of criminal prosecution by third States. It regarded the pun-
ishment of perpetrators of war crimes exclusively as a matter
concerning the belligerent States involved. It appears also from
the Resolution adopted in Munich in 1883 on «Règles relatives aux
conflits des lois pénales en matière de compétence» that before
the First World War the notion of universal jurisdiction had not yet
gained firm ground in lawyers’ minds. In Article 10 of that Reso-
lution, provision is made for instances where otherwise, particu-
larly because the place of the commission of the crime cannot be
identified, no prosecution could take place. A different philosophy
underlies the Resolution adopted at the Cambridge session in 1931
on «Le conflit des lois pénales en matière de compétence». This
Resolution provides in Article 5:
Tout Etat a le droit de punir des actes commis à I’étranger par un
étranger découvert sur son territoire lorsque ces actes constituent
une infraction contre des intérêts généraux protégés par le droit
international (tels que la piraterie, la traite des noirs, la traite des
blanches, la propagation de maladies contagieuses, I’atteinte a des
moyens de communication internationaux, canaux, câbles sous-
marins, la falsification des monnaies, instruments de crédit, etc.), a
condition que l’extradition de I’inculpé ne soit pas demandée ou que
l’ offre en soit refusée par l’, Etat sur le territoire duquel le délit a été
commis ou dont I’inculpé est ressortissant.
This Resolution already reflects some of the concerns of the
present-day world. No observer will fail to note, however, that
war crimes are not mentioned there. As for crimes against hu-
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manity and the crime of genocide, it seems that the world had to
go through the abhorrent experiences of the Second World War in
order to realize that the international community should establish
some protective mechanisms against these types of offences.
3. At its Milan Session 1993, the 19th Commission presented a
draft Resolution on «The extraterritorial jurisdiction of States»
(Rapporteur: Maarten Bos)1. This draft contained one provision
on the principle of universality. It was worded as follows:
1. Under the principle of universality, jurisdiction may be exercised
in order to protect certain interests of the international community as
a whole.
2. Jurisdiction under the principle of universality extends to persons
regardless of their nationality and the place where they committed
their acts.
3. The principle of universality shall apply to offences as defined
under conventional and customary international law, such as piracy,
the hijacking of aircraft, terrorism and the trade of narcotics.
4. Jurisdiction under the previous paragraph may be exercised
irrespective of signature or ratification of any international convention
by the State of the nationality of the accused.
As can be seen from this text, the three classes of crimes
which the 17th Commission is mandated to study were not taken
into account by the 19th Commission.
4. Among the major initiatives designed to clarify the meaning
and scope of universal jurisdiction, one should mention in particu-
lar three undertakings. First, Amnesty International has established
a comprehensive documentation designed to prove that universal
jurisdiction is a principle already widely recognized under interna-
tional instruments and in the domestic practice of States.2 Second,
the Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice
of the International Law Association produced for its London ses-
sion in 2000 a comprehensive report (written by Professor Menno
1 Ann. IDI, vol. 65-II, p. 133 at p. 135 (1994).
2 Universal Jurisdiction - The Duty of States to Enact and E1iforce Legislation,




T. Kamminga)3, which ends with a set of conclusions and recom-
mendations. One of these propositions (2.) states that with regard
to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes States are
entitled, under customary international law, to exercise universal
jurisdiction4.
5. The third remarkable achievement is the drawing up of the
«Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction»5. This set of prin-
ciples owes its coming into being to an initiative of the American
Association for the International Commission of Jurists. Members
of this Association succeeded in eliciting interest on the part of a
number of leading U.S. human rights lawyers, among them Mr
Cherif Bassiouni, who produced a first draft. Most reasonably, in
the brochure reflecting the Principles it is openly acknowledged
that some of the Principles must be located halfway between lex
lata and lex ferenda6. In any event, as another collective under-




6. Concerning the concept of jurisdiction, there is no need to
break new ground. A number of authoritative definitions exist which
need neither correction nor improvement. Thus, the Restatement
of the Law Third (The Foreign Relations Law of the United States)
of the American Law Institute refers to jurisdiction as «the au-
thority of States to prescribe their law, to subject persons and things
to adjudication in their courts and other tribunals, and to enforce
their law, both judicially and non judicially»7. Our late confrère
F.A. Mann, in his Hague lectures, characterized jurisdiction as
«the State’s right of regulation ... It does not matter whether it is
3 ILA, Report of the 69th Conference London, London, 2000, pp. 403-431.
4 Ibid., p. 423.
5 Princeton (New Jersey, 2001).
6 Ibid., p. 39.
7 Vol. 1, St. Paul (Minn., 1987), p. 230.
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exercised by legislative, executive or judicial measures...»8. In his
draft Resolution submitted to the Institute at its Milan session 1993,
our confrère Maarten Bos suggested the following definition : «Ju-
risdiction is to be understood as a State’s authority to subject persons
(natural or juridical) and things to its legal order» (Article 1)9. Many
other formulae could be referred to. But they would not add any-
thing of essential importance. It is the sovereignty of the State which
finds its reflection in the doctrine of jurisdiction. According to the
Charter of the United Nations (Article 2 (1)) and to a time-honoured
rule of customary international law, sovereignty has certain limits. In
the UN Charter, it appears as «sovereign equality». This two-tier
definition makes abundantly clear that the sovereignty of one State
is confined by the sovereignty of all other States. Indeed, it is trivial
to note that absolute sovereignty without any legal restrictions would
lead into chaos and anarchy. International law has as one of its pri-
mary functions to delimit the areas of competence (or jurisdiction) of
all the States in order to ensure peaceful coexistence side by side
under the rule of law, guaranteeing the sovereignty not only of the
big and powerful, but also of the small States that lack any military
might10. In this perspective, the rules on attribution of jurisdiction to
every State have an important role to play.
7. What is in issue here is jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e. the
authority to enact legal roles making certain conduct a punishable
offence under domestic law11, and jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e.
the authority to implement the applicable law in a given case. To
the extent that jurisdiction to prescribe exists for offences classi-
fied as crimes against humanity, jurisdiction to adjudicate must
also be deemed to exist12. Otherwise, jurisdiction to prescribe would
8 «The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law», RCADI, t. III (1964-1), p.
1 at 13, now also in id., Studies in International Law, Oxford (1973), p. 1, at 6.
9 Loc. cit. (supra note 1), p. 133.
1 0 We agree with the President of the ICJ, Judge Guillaume, in his separate opinion
in the Arrest Warrant case, judgement of 14 February 2002 (paragraph 15).
1 1 See § 404 of the Restatement of the American Law Institute, op. cit. (supra note
7), p. 254: «A State has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for
certain offences recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern...».
1 2 See § 423, ibid,, p. 318: «A State may exercise jurisdiction through its courts
to enforce its criminal laws that punish universal crimes or other non-territo-
rial offences within the State’s jurisdiction to prescribe».
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make no sense. On the other hand, however, it is clear that meas-
ures of physical enforcement can be taken only by the territorially
competent State or by an international organization empowered to
exercise executive police powers in the territory concerned.
8. The starting point of this reflection on jurisdiction of States
in criminal matters must therefore be a rejection of the Lotus doc-
trine of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). In
this well-known judgment of 7 September 192713, the crucial issue
was the right of Turkey to try a French officer, whose ship, the
Lotus, had collided with a Turkish ship, thereby causing the death
of eight Turkish seamen. France contended that as the flag State
of the ship on which the responsible officer had performed his
service, it enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction. The PCIJ rejected this
argument, holding that:
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States
may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory it
[international law] leaves them in this respect a wide measure of
discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive roles;
as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles
which it regards as best and most suitable14.
According to this pronouncement, States would be free to adopt
extraterritorial legislation and take measures with extraterritorial
effect as they see fit, unless a specific prohibitive rule prevents
them from acting as planned. Clearly, this proposition has been
overruled during the last decades. There is broad agreement in
the practice of States as well as in the legal literature that States
need specific justification if they seek to extend the legal effects
of their sovereign acts beyond their borders15. Thus, the order of
priorities has been reversed. Whereas according to a traditional
doctrine of sovereignty the powers of States were in principle
unlimited, the prevailing view today requires States to show a spe-
1 3 Series A No. 10.
1 4 Ibid., p. 19.
1 5 See as a representative statement of the legal position the Restatement of the
Law Third, op. cit. (supra note 7), pp. 235-319, §§ 402-423.
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cial interest if and when they act extraterritorially. In international
criminal law, it has become communis opinio that acts of prosecu-
tion can be legitimated by a limited number of principles, (1) the
territorial principle, (2) the active personality principle, (3) the pas-
sive personality principle (controversial), (4) the effects principle,
(5) the protective principle, and (6) the principle of universal juris-
diction. States do not enjoy unfettered jurisdiction as long as no
rule to the contrary can be held against them16.
2) Universal Jurisdiction
9. The concept of universal jurisdiction is less uncontroversial.
In the first place, it should be underlined that universal jurisdiction
must be distinguished from jurisdiction vested in international tri-
bunals. Universal jurisdiction means putting domestic courts (and
of course the relevant prosecuting authorities) at the service of
the international community. Relying on universal jurisdiction, na-
tional courts may, without requiring any more specific authoriza-
tion from an international body, initiate criminal proceedings against
an alleged offender. From a systematic viewpoint, universal juris-
diction constitutes a half-hearted device in the absence of compe-
tent international institutions. In that sense, universal jurisdiction
can be compared to the rights deriving from obligations erga omnes,
a concept which permits individual States to take measures for
the defense of the interests of the international community, not
against individuals, but against States. With the establishment of
truly international tribunals the notion of international community
gains strength and coherence. The existing international criminal
tribunals –the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (lCC) under the Rome
Statute of 1998 are all creations of the international community,
and they act accordingly for a common purpose. In principle, there-
1 6 Ambiguous statements on the Lotus doctrine by Paola Gaeta, «Les règles
internationales sur les critères de compétence des juges nationaux», in Anto-
nio Cassese/Mireille Delmas-Marty (eds.), Crimes internationaux et
jurisdictions Internationals, Paris, 2002, pp. 191-213 at pp. 194-198.
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fore, the States which make up the international community have
good reasons to believe in the trustworthiness of the judicial mecha-
nisms which they themselves have brought into being. Although
some States, in particular the United States of America (hence-
forth: United States), now reject the Rome Statute, it cannot be
overlooked that they were all given the opportunity to participate
in the negotiations and in the drafting exercise by presenting their
proposals and voicing their objections. The fact that not all of the
suggestions put forward by the current dissenters were accepted17,
does not mean that the construction as such is faulty. In no inter-
national decision-making process can just one of the participants
demand or expect that his views prevail without any exception.
10. The higher degree of trustworthiness to be granted to in-
ternational criminal tribunals than to national courts of States is
reflected, e.g., in the Resolution adopted by the Institute at its
Vancouver Session where it suggested (Article 2) that a Head of
State should enjoy, in criminal matters,
immunity from jurisdiction before the courts of a foreign State for
any crime he or she may have committed, regardless of its gravity.
On purpose, this rule was not extended to proceedings before
any of the existing international criminal tribunals (Article 11 (1)),
where equality before the law applies without any exception. Al-
ready in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nu-
remberg18 a provision (Article 7) made it clear that:
the official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or
responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be
considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment.
1 7 Yet, many were accepted, see statement by U.S. Ambassador D. Scheffer,
reproduced by Hans-Peter Kaul, «The Continuing Struggle on the Jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court», in Horst Fischer et al. (eds.), International
and National Prosecution 01 Crimes Under lnternational Law, Berlin (2001),
p. 21 at p. 23.




There is no need to elaborate on the continuance in force of
this rule, which now appears in Article 27 of the Rome Statute.
11. Some authors have taken the view that the concept of
universal jurisdiction should not be used in instances where pros-
ecution presupposes a territorial link of the suspect with the forum
State. On that ground, they seek to distinguish situations falling
within the scope of one of the many try-or-extradite clauses in
international treaties from universal jurisdiction proper. Thus, our
consoeur Dame Rosalyn Higgins has defended the view that «uni-
versal jurisdiction, properly ca11ed, allows any State to assert ju-
risdiction over an offence»19.
M. Cherif Bassiouni has taken a similar stance20 Of course,
every writer is free to coin the concepts he/she is handling ac-
cording to his/her preferences as long as there exist no authorita-
tive definitions. However, it does not appear that cases judicially
dealt with under the rule «to try or to extradite» should be ex-
cluded from the scope of the concept of universal jurisdiction.
What must be explained and justified is the fact that under that
specific title of jurisdiction the judiciary of a given State is empow-
ered to seize itself of an offence with which it has no genuine link.
Persons may be tried regardless of the location of the place where
the offence was committed, regardless of the nationality of the
suspect or the victim, and even regardless of an actual, palpable
interest of the prosecuting State. Under normal circumstances,
such operations would amount to interference in the domestic af-
fairs of the third State(s) concerned. As a rule, occurrences in a
given State that have no direct transboundary effect do not fall
within the competence of other States. Just the presence of an
1 9 «International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Dis-
putes. General Course on Public International Law», RCAD, t. 230 (1991-
V), p. 9 at p.99. See also the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant case ,judgment of the ICJ
of 14 February 2002, para. 41 : «By the loose use of language the latter [scil.
to try or to extradite] has come to be referred to as ‘universal jurisdiction’,
though this is really an obligatory territorial jurisdiction over persons, albeit
in relation to acts committed elsewhere».
2 0 «Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and
Contemporary Practice», 42 Virgo JIL (2001) pp. 81-162 at p. 107, p. 118.
126
Documentos
alleged offender in the territory of a State does not establish, as
such, a genuine link of that State to the crime in issue.
12. It is true, however, that universal jurisdiction has a differ-
ent meaning according to whether States may be considered free
to prosecute anyone anywhere just on the basis of his/her alleged
conduct or whether at least the presence of the alleged offender
in their territory is required (forum deprehensionis). This was
one of the issues raised by the Arrest Warrant case before the
ICJ21, but which was not touched upon by the ICJ itself. Only in
the separate opinions of Judges Guillaume, Ranjeva and Rezek
and the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal does one find lengthy considerations on the scope
ratione materiae of universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction
in the broad sense is termed «compétence universelle par défaut»
by Judge Guillaume22, «universal jurisdiction in absentia» or
«compétence universelle in absentia» by Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans and Buergenthal23, and by Judge Ranjeva24, and «ab-
solute universal jurisdiction» by Antonio Cassese in a comment on
the judgment25. According to the interpretation adopted by the
Belgian investigating judge who issued the controversial arrest
warrant against the former Congolese Foreign Minister Yerodia
Ndombasi, Belgian legislation conferred indeed jurisdiction on the
judiciary to institute criminal proceedings against persons charged
with war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity irrespec-
tive of their place of sojourn although the text of the relevant pro-
vision of domestic law did not say so specifically26. In recent deci-
2 1 Judgment of 14 February 2002.
2 2 Ibid., separate opinion, paras. 9,16,17.
2 3 Ibid., joint separate opinion, para. 59.
2 4 Ibid., declaration, para. 5.
2 5 «When may Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? - Some
Comments on The Congo v. Belgium Case», http://www.ejil.org/journal/
curdevs.htrnl. The more limited form of universal jurisdiction is called
»conditional jurisdiction» by Cassese. See also his considerations in «Y a-t-
il un conflit insurmontable entre souveraineté des Etats et justice pénale
internationale?», in Crimes internationaux et juridictions internationale?, op.
cit. (supra note 16), pp. 13-29 at 22-26.
2 6 Loi relative a la répression des infractions graves aux conventions
internationales de Geneve du 12 août 1949 et aux protocoles I et II du 8 juin
1977, additionnels à ces conventions, of 16 June 1993, amended by: Loi
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sions, however, this interpretation has been rejected. The Belgian
judiciary now takes the view that the prosecuted persons must be
present in the Belgian territory27.
13. In Germany, too, the highest judicial body in criminal mat-
ters, the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof), held in its judgment
of 30 April 199928 that notwithstanding the invokability of univer-
sal jurisdiction in cases of genocide a special link with Germany
was required, which it found in the fact that the accused had lived
in Germany for long periods of time29. It argued that without any
such link the principle of non-intervention would be breached. This
decision was criticized in legal doctrine30, and indeed the same
chamber of the Federal Court opined in a judgment of 21 Febru-
ary 200131 that no special link might be necessary where Ger-
many was obligated under an international treaty like the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 to initiate criminal proceedings. It
remains, however, that with regard to all other instances, in par-
ticular with regard to genocide, the German jurisprudence has
opted against an understanding of universal jurisdiction in the broad
sense as originally advocated in Belgium.
14. The try-or-extradite clauses, which establish the jurisdic-
tion of the State of sojourn or custody as a duty which must be
relative à la répression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire,
of 10 February 1999. Article 7 (1) of that Law provides: »Les juridictions
belges sont compétentes pour connaître des infractions prévues à la présente
loi, indépendamment du lieu ou celles-ci auront été commises».
2 7 Judgment of the Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, Chambre des mises in accusation,
26 June 2002, in the Sharon and Yaron case. See also below in the annex a
short overview of the legal position in Belgium.
2 8 BGHSt 45, 64, at 66 ; Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2000), p. 2517.
2 9 The German Constitutional Court, decision of 12 December 2000,
Euroäpaische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (2000), p. 76 at p. 82 (section III. 6),
avoided to make a determination on the issue.
3 0 Kai Ambos/Steffen Wirth, «Genocide and War Crimes in the Former Yugos-
lavia Before German Criminal Courts», in Fischer et al. (eds.), lnternational
and National Prosecution of Crimes ..., op. cit. (supra note 17), p. 769 at pp.
778-783; Gerhard Werle, case comment, Juristenzeitung (1999), p. 1181 at
pp. 1182-1183; «Völkerstrafrecht und geltendes deutsches Strafrecht»,
Juristenzeitung (2000), p. 755 at p. 759.
3 1 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2001), p. 2728 at p. 2732, Sokolovic case.
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complied with, do not clear1y answer the question since they do
not say anything about the rights of third States which are not
even related to the crime by the tenuous link of the presence of
the alleged offender in their territory. Therefore, on the basis of
conventional law it remains open whether any third State could in
such instances start proceedings and request the extradition of the
suspect. It seems reasonable to require that at some point in time
the prosecuting State must establish close contact with the de-
fendant. Generally, trials in absentia cannot be deemed to yield
just results. The «try-or-extradite clauses» have precisely for their
aim to reconcile the principle of universal jurisdiction with the le-
gitimate rights of an alleged offender32. In any event, judicial practice
does not seem to support an unrestricted right of any third State
unrelated to the crime to initiate proceedings against an alleged
offender33.
15. In the legal literature, there is broad agreement as to the
legitimation of universal jurisdiction. Crimes that may be prosecuted
by relying on universal jurisdiction, in particular the «core crimes»
dealt with in this report, affect the foundations of a civilized state
of affairs in the international community. Therefore, it can rightly
be said that the pivotal element of universal jurisdiction is nothing
else than the nature of the crime34. Proceeding from the premise
3 2 Underlined by the Cour d’ appel de Bruxelles, Chambre des mises en
accusation, 26 June 2002, in the Sharon and Yaron case (supra note 27),
point 9. On this issue, we cannot share the views expressed by Judges
Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in their joint separate opinion in the
Arrest Warrant case (supra note 19), para. 56.
3 3 This is al so the prevailing opinion in the legal literature, see Bassiouni, loco
cit. (supra note 20), p.81 at p.139; W olfgang WeiB, «Wikerstrafrecht
zwischen Weltprinzip und Irnmunität», Juristenzeitung (2002), p. 696 at
pp. 699-70 l. The judges of the ICJ who touched upon the issue in their
individual opinions were divided. Whereas Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal, paras. 54-59, advocate universal jurisdiction in the absolute
sense, Judges Ranjeva (para. 5) and Rezek (paras. 8-9) require the presence
of the accused in the territory of the prosecuting State. Antonio Cassese,
lnternational Law, Oxford (2001) p. 261-262, tried to find a balanced midway
solution and has remained faithful to this line in Cassese/Marty, loco cit.
(supra note 16).
3 4 See, for instance, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (supra
note 5), Principle 1 (1); Kenneth C. Randall, «Universal Jurisdiction Under
International Law», 66 Texas LR (1988), p. 785 at p. 788.
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that there exists an international community, conceived of prima-
rily as a community of common values, it is assumed that, in prin-
ciple, every State has an interest in taking measures to repress
offences which threaten the maintenance of basic rights for all
human beings. To restrict jurisdiction to States authorized to act
under any of the classical principles governing jurisdiction and to
States in whose territory the accused is present may be consid-
ered as a compromise which reconciles the interests of the inter-
national community with the legitimate interests of any alleged
offender.
3) Criminal Jurisdiction
16. At first glance, it seems easy to define the word«crimi-
nal». According to habitual linguistic usage, that word, in connec-
tion with the concept of jurisdiction, denotes the prosecution of
offences by the judiciary of a given State. In criminal proceedings,
it is the power of the State which asserts its sovereign right to
secure law and order. Consequently, a criminal trial ends up not
just with a decision ordering the defendant to do this or that, but
imposing on the defendant, if he/she is not acquitted, a fine or
sentencing to him to a penalty of deprivation of liberty. But recent
practice has produced hybrid forms of judicial actions the classifi-
cation of which gives rise to doubts. The most prominent example
of such a hybrid form of judicial action is authorized by the United
States Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a statute enacted in 178935
which was re-discovered in 1980 in the Filártiga v. Peña Irala
case36. On the basis of the ATCA, an alien can bring a tort action
against a respondent by alleging that the respondent has breached
obligations incumbent upon him/herself under the law of nations.
Textually, the ATCA provides: «The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States».
There can be no doubt that intrinsically cases brought under the
ATCA are civil and not criminal cases. What the claimant seeks is
3 5 Codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
3 6 630 F .2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) ; 19 ILM (1980), p. 966.
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reparation for the wrongs he has suffered, not punishment of the
respondent. Nevertheless, such cases are characterized by a strong
element of retribution. The United States puts its tribunals at the
disposal of aliens with a view to facilitating effective sanctioning
of the alleged offences.
Recently, for instance, claims have been introduced before
United States tribunals which seek billions of dollars of reparation
for the alleged involvement of European undertakings in the South
African economy during the time of the apartheid regime.
17. Many writers refer indeed to the ATCA in connection with
universal jurisdiction in criminal matters. Thus, Antonio Cassese
recently wrote that the United States was the country whose na-
tional courts have taken the most vigorous action against crimes
committed abroad.
They have taken from the shelf and skilfully dusted off a statute
passed in 178937.
In other words, he conceives of the ATCA as an instrument
designed to permit the imposition of sanctions on account of inter-
national crimes38. In a more general fashion, United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson expressed her
concern over the negotiations in the framework of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law on a new Convention
on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters. According to the clauses of that draft in-
strument, which is currently under consideration, in tort cases no
action could be brought in the courts of a third State unrelated to
the factual events having caused the damage (Article 10). To the
High Commissioner, the regime governing civil actions that claim
reparation in instances of international crimes pertains to the overall
legal framework serving to combat such crimes39. Along similar
3 7 «International Criminal Justice: Is it Needed in the Present World
Community», in Gerard Kreijen (ed.), State, Sovereignty, and International
Governance, Oxford (2002), pp. 239-258 at p. 242.
3 8 In a recent article, he speaks of «humanitarisme impérialiste», loc. cit. (supra
note 25), p. 25.
3 9 See her foreword to the Princeton Principles, op. cit. (supra note 5), p. 16.
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lines, lawyers actively promoting remedies against perpetrators of
serious crimes are trying to convince their audiences that the de-
marcation line between civil and criminal remedies cannot be
maintained since according to the legislation of many countries
both remedies go hand in hand when a tort has been committed40.
Indeed, the ATCA seems to constitute a direct offspring of the
doctrine of international crimes. Only by clinging thereto can the
United States possibly justify its claim to jurisdiction41.
4) Jus Cogens and Universal Jurisdiction
18. However, it would be much too simplistic to argue that all
offences that may legitimately be classified as international crimes
are subject to universal jurisdiction. Yet, many writers follow that
logic, which is indeed extremely tempting. Christopher Joyner is
one of those who support the notion that universal jurisdiction flows
automatically from the violation of norms which have a jus co-
gens or erga omnes character42. Mr Cherif Bassiouni has force-
fully advocated the same idea43. In the Pinochet case, Lord
Browne-Wilkinson44, Lord Hutton45 and Lord Millet46 joined that
current of opinion, and recently Antonio Cassese has advocated
extending universal jurisdiction to all international crimes47. It must
be admitted that these authors have identified a legitimate starting
4 0 See, in particular, Beth Stephens, «Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and
International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human
Rights Violations», 27 Yale JIL (2002), pp. 1-57.
4 1 Explicitly, in their joint separate opinion in the Arrest Warrant case (supra
note 19), Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal note that the exercise
by American federal courts of the powers granted to them by the ATCA
«has not attracted the approbation of States generally» (para. 48).
4 2 «Arresting Impunity : The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War
Criminal to Accountability», 59 Law and Contemporary Problems (1996),
pp. 153 at p. 169.
4 3 Loc. cit. (supra note 20), pp. 148-152.
4 4 See his opinion in the second judgment of24 March 1999,38 ILM (1999), p.
582 at p. 589.
4 5 Ibid., p. 627 at pp. 636-637.
4 6 Ibid., p. 643 at pp. 649-650.




point. On the other hand, however, acceptance or rejection of
universal jurisdiction cannot be based solely on the interests of the
international community in forestalling and repressing grave crimes
that threaten full enjoyment of human rights by the victims. A
well-pondered answer must also take into account the interests of
the potential defendants and of the States which may be indirectly
charged if and when proceedings are instituted against one of
their representatives. Joy over the progress which has been at-
tained by acknowledging universal jurisdiction within a relatively
broad scope ratione materiae should not detract from the simple
realization that universal jurisdiction can easily be abused. Only in
few countries is the judiciary genuinely independent from the ex-
ecutive branch of government. And even where this is the case, it
should not be overlooked that judges are more often than not bi-
ased in favour of their own country. This has nothing to do with
miscarriage of justice. However, it is a fact of life, empirically
corroborated, that judges normally have greater understanding for
the viewpoint and the interests of their own country than for the
views articulated by someone belonging to a different political
system. Rightly, in our view, in the Pinochet case Lord Slynn of
Hadley cautioned against equating crimes under international law
with universal jurisdiction:
That international law crimes should be tried before international
tribunals or in the perpetrator’s own state is one thing ; that they
should be impleaded without regard to a long-established customary
international law rule in the Courts of other States is another ... The
fact even that an act is recognised as a crime under international law
does not mean that the Courts of all Sta te s have jurisdiction to try it
...There is no universality of jurisdiction for crimes against
international law...48.
19. Almost without any exception, when dealing with these
issues, writers talk about the necessity to combat international
crime and the corresponding perpetrators as effectively as possi-
ble. But it should not be overlooked that during the decisive first
4 8 First judgment of the House of Lords, 25 November 1998,37 ILM (1998), p.
1302 at pp. 1312-1313 [recalled by Judge Guillaume in his separate opinion
in the Arrest Warrant case, supra note 10, para. 12].
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stages of a criminal proceeding any person can invoke the pre-
sumption of innocence. An indictment is based on allegations which
are not yet proven. And yet, measures may then be taken which
severely interfere with the rights of an alleged offender. In par-
ticular, he/she can be arrested or extradited to a foreign country,
far away from his homeland where legal defense may be difficult
to obtain and costly49. The legal system of Ruritania does not pro-
vide the same guarantees as the legal systems of France, Ger-
many or the United Kingdom50. To date, scenarios have generally
been developed according to which courts of Western States pros-
ecute offences committed elsewhere on the globe, especially in
Third World countries. The proceeding between the Congo and
Belgium in the Arrest Warrant case, which ended with the judg-
ment of the International Court of Justice of 14 February 2002,
constitutes the prototype of that configuration, which smacks slightly
of neo-colonialism But the procedural relationship could also be
reversed, Belgian citizens being arrested and brought to trial in the
Congo, to give just an example which is suggested by the proceed-
ing before the ICJ51.
5) Possible Abuse of Universal Jurisdiction?
20. Fears that abuse may mar the exercise of universal juris-
diction have no tangible bases regarding the crime of genocide.
Genocide has relatively clear-cut contours, above all after the first
judgments of the ICTY and the ICTR. It would be difficult to
manipulate a charge of genocide in any plausible fashion. Regard-
ing war crimes and crimes against humanity, however, no such
straightforward statement can be made. In the Rome Statute,
4 9 For a head-on attack on universal jurisdiction, see Henry Kissinger, «The
Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction», Foreign Affairs (July/August 2001), pp.
86-96.
5 0 In this regard, the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant case (para. 59) seems to be somewhat
ingénue in positing that such extraterritorial charges «may only be laid by a
prosecutor or juge d’instruction who acts in full independence, without links
to or control by the government of that State».
5 1 See individual opinion by Judge Rezek in the Arrest Warrant case, para. 8.
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crimes against humanity (Article 7) and particularly war crimes
(Article 8) have grown to such an extent that even for a trained
lawyer it is now difficult to correctly assess the scope ratione
materiae of these offences. Given the fact, above all, that the
Rome Statute acknowledges also command responsibility (Article
28) and complicity in the most various forms (Article 23 (3)) and
that this extension of criminal responsibility will also –unavoid-
ably– spill over into general international law, it is not difficult to
construct a case against a political leader who has never had any
direct contact with the relevant atrocities.
21. Concerning crimes against peace or aggression, which fig-
ured prominently in the Charter of the Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal52, these considerations have been deemed to be
so weighty that it has never been suggested that they should be
subject to universal jurisdiction. When the International Law Com-
mission (ILC) adopted on first reading (1991) the draft Code of
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, it acknowl-
edged that aggression could not be dealt with in the same manner
as the other crimes identified by it. Explicitly, the relevant provi-
sion (Article 15) stated in para. 5, which was bracketed due to
disagreement within the ILC that «any determination by the Secu-
rity Council as to the existence of an act of aggression is binding
on national courts»53. Notwithstanding the lack of clarity affecting
this formula, the sole fact that a special provision was considered
necessary evinced that the suggested obligation to try or to extra-
dite (Article 6) was not to apply unreservedly in instances of alle-
gations of aggression54. The reluctance to align aggression with
the other crimes under the projected Code became even more
visible in the final version of the draft Code, which was adopted in
199655. Whereas Article 8 contained an obligation on States to
establish their jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity,
5 2 Reprinted in von Münch (ed.), Dokumente..., op. cit. (supra note 18), p. 45;
Article 6 of the Charter is also reproduced in Adam Roberts/Richard Guelf
(eds.), Documents of the Laws of War, 3rd ed., Oxford (2000), p. 177.
5 3 Yearbook of the ILC 1991, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 96.
5 4 For the commentary on that bracketed provision see Yearbook of the ILC
1988, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 73 para. 6.
5 5 See Yearbook of the ILC 1996, Vol. II, Part Two, pp. 17 ff.
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crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, and war
crimes, it reserved the case of aggression by specifying that inso-
far jurisdiction «shall rest with an international criminal court».
Quite obviously, it was the fear of political manipulation which led
the ILC to taking this decision. No other reason can be found
behind the determination by the Rome Conference in 1998 to lay
to rest aggression until some remote day when a substantive defi-
nition might have been found (Article 5 (2». It is this separate
treatment of the crime against peace par excellence which am-
ply demonstrates that suggesting any proposition on the relation-
ship between jus cogens or erga omnes obligations and universal
jurisdiction requires a most careful balancing of the interests in
issue.
C. THE DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
22. After these preliminary observations, the three classes of
international crimes committed to the attention of the Commission
require to be studied in detail. Although genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes are often dealt with as a unity («core
crimes»), it would be wrong to follow those steps. Each one of the
three crimes, which in reality are clusters of crimes, is subject to a
specific regime. General international law and conventional law
are bound up with one another in widely varying ways.
1) Genocide
23. It is a matter of common knowledge that genocide did not
yet appear as a separate class of crime in the Charter of the Nu-
remberg International Military Tribunal. All the relevant acts, which
today would be evaluated as genocide, were dealt with under the
heading of crimes against humanity. Genocide received its spe-
cific conceptual identity by virtue of the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which the UN
General Assembly adopted on 9 December 194856. No trace can
5 6 Resolution 260 A (III).
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be found in the text of the Convention of universal jurisdiction.
Article VI was framed with remarkable caution. It reads:
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated
in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the
territory of which the act was committed, or by such international
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
This provision can be construed differently. A literal reading
might suggest that Article VI was framed with a view to restrict-
ing jurisdiction in instances of genocide to the territorial State and
to an international penal tribunal. Following this approach, Article
VI would have to be understood as a prohibition addressed to any
other third State to claim jurisdiction. This is indeed a view which
seems to reflect the intentions which were pursued during the
drafting process. In a recent monograph, William Schabas has
attempted to buttress that restrictive interpretation by sifting the
travaux preparatoires57.
24. However, the Eichmann case made clear that Article VI
must be assigned another meaning. Eichmann, a Nazi activist who
saw his personal fulfilment in bringing about the «final solution» of
the Jewish question, was made accountable before Israeli tribunals
after having been brought surreptitiously from Argentina to Israel.
Understandably, Eichmann defended himself by contesting the ju-
risdiction of the courts which tried him. This defense failed. Both
the courts of first58 and second instance (the Supreme Court of
Israel)59 invoked universal jurisdiction, arguing that Article VI was
confined to setting forth a duty to prosecute, which was incumbent
upon the territorial State, but no other (third) State. This interpreta-
tion has been wideIy accepted, although some voices rightly draw
attention to the fact that Israel’s prosecution of Eichmann could
have been easiIy justified by the passive personality principle or the
protective principle60. Whatever opinion one may have regarding
5 7 W.A. Schabas, Genocide in lnternational Law, Cambridge (2000), pp. 355 ff.
5 8 District Court of Jerusalem, judgment of 12 December 1961,36 ILR, at p. 39 p. 25.
5 9 Judgment of 29 May 1962, ibid., pp. 303-304.
6 0 See Bassiouni, loc. cit. (supra note 20), p. 137; Princeton Principles, op. cit.
(supra note 5), p. 42.
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the foundations of the Eichmann trial, it would appear to be crystal
clear that the Genocide Convention did not wish to take away op-
tions for action which are available under general international law.
It would indeed be rather strange if Article VI had to be construed
as banning, with regard to genocide cases, the passive personality
principle and the protective principle. The elaboration of the Con-
vention was meant as a step to strengthen the fight against geno-
cide. If one followed the restrictive interpretation, however, States
parties would be worse off than third States not having ratified the
Convention. The absurdity of this result speaks against it.
25. Rejection of a restrictive reading of Article VI does not
answer the question, however, if genocide is a crime placed under
universal jurisdiction. As pointed out above, universal jurisdiction
is a power, a faculté, which States are free to exercise or not to
exercise, unless there exists a conventional duty to the contrary.
In the absence of a clear indication in the Convention itself, the
answer must be sought in general international law. Following the
traditional method of identifying rules of customary international
law, the student is called upon to review, in the first place, the
relevant practice of States. In that regard, the record was ex-
tremely poor for long decades. Reference could be made, in the
first place, to the Eichmann case. In a second case, the 1985
case of Demjanjuk, United States tribunals granted a request by
Israel for the extradition of a person who was suspected of having
committed indescribable atrocities in a concentration camp during
the Second World War61. In recent years, however, the picture
has changed. In Germany, in at least four cases perpetrators of
genocide were sentenced to life imprisonment or long years of
deprivation of liberty. Invariably, the Supreme Federal Court, which
discharges the functions of a Cour de cassation, confirmed the
convictions and sentencing62. In pronouncing upon a constitutional
6 1 776 F.2d 571, 582-583 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
6 2 For a summary, see the ILA Report, supra note 3, pp. 428-429 : case of
Nikola Jorgic, Supreme Federal Court, 30 April 1999, Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen (BGHSt) 45, 64 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrifl (2000), p. 2517 ; case of Maksim Sokolovic, Supreme Federal
Court, 21 February 2001, ibid. (2001),p. 2728; case of Djuradi Kusljic,
Supreme Federal Court, 21 February 2001, ibid. (2001), p. 2732.
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complaint by one of the convicted perpetrators (Nikola Jorgic),
the Federal Constitutional Court explicitly supported the applica-
bility of universal jurisdiction to genocide.63 Austrian64 tribunals,
too, have unequivocally affirmed their right to exercise universal
jurisdiction with regard to instances of alleged genocide although
in the case that has been reported the accused was acquitted. In a
French case of 1998, the Cour de cassation confined itself to
stating that the Genocide Convention does not provide for univer-
sal jurisdiction, but refrained from examining whether French ju-
risdiction may exist under general international law65.
26. The list of relevant judgments may not be long, but none of
the pronouncements has been seriously objected to, except by the
defendants in the cases at hand. Thus, there exists a consistent
practice which seems to be buttressed by an opinio juris that
stands almost unchallenged.
27. Lastly, it should be noted that the legal position has changed
under the impact of the Rome Statute. There is no denying the
fact that the International Criminal Court itself does not enjoy uni-
versal jurisdiction, not even with regard to genocide. Its jurisdic-
tion depends on the territorial State (the State where the crime
was committed) or the State of nationality of the suspect having
accepted the commitments under the Statute, except for situa-
tions which have been referred to it by the Security Council (Ar-
ticle 13 (b))66. But if this is the case it can request the surrender of
the suspect from any State party to the Statute. This system works
only if third States, which have no special link with the crime but
are involved solely through the presence of the suspect in their
territory, are authorized to take action against the suspect by ar-
6 3 Decision of 12 December 2000, Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrifl (2001),
p. 76 at p.81.
6 4 Case of Dusko Cvjetkovic, see ILA Report 2000, loc. cit. (supra note 3), p.
426.
6 5 Case of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, Cour de cassation, 6 January 1998, 102
RGDIP (1998), p. 825 at p. 827.
6 6 During the preparatory work on the Rome Statute, Germany proposed that
the ICC be vested with universal jurisdiction without any preconditions (see




resting him/her in the first place, before possibly granting the re-
quest addressed to them. In other words, universal jurisdiction of
national courts is a logical premise of the worldwide mechanism
brought into being by the Rome Statute. In fact, the Statute recalls
in its preamble that «it is the duty of every State to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes».
This is certainly a wrong statement. There exists no duty of States
generally to prosecute international crimes. To rebut this asser-
tion, it suffices to refer to the Genocide Convention which explic-
itly confines the duty of prosecution to the territorial State, the
State where acts of genocide were committed. Wherever univer-
sal jurisdiction is accompanied by a duty to exercise it in any given
case, the drafters of the relevant conventions specifically said so.
Even these clauses have often been ignored. All observers agree
that the system of universal jurisdiction has not been too effective
in the past67. Consequently, it would be vain to look for a practice
which might sustain a rule of customary law of which the state-
ment in the preamble of the Rome Statute could be the reflection.
All this, however, does not detract from the conclusion that the
system of international criminal justice as envisaged by the draft-
ers of the Rome Statute would not be satisfactorily workable if
States did not enjoy universal jurisdiction with regard to all the
crimes listed in the Statute.
28. It stands to reason that the above considerations apply
only to States parties to the Rome Statute. All other States may
invoke the traditional rule according to which pacta tertiis nec
nocent nec prosunt (Article 34 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties). The absence of a considerable number of States must
be taken all the more seriously since what we are facing is not a
matter of passivity or oblivion, but a dispute touching upon issues
of principle. The United States and some other States disagree
fundamentally with the policy line embarked upon with the Rome
Statute. Furthermore, universal jurisdiction as an auxiliary func-
tion in the service of the ICC cannot be equated with universal
jurisdiction tout court.
6 7 See, in particular, Rafaëlle Maison, «Les premiers cas d’application des
dispositions pénales des Conventions de Genève par les juridictions inter-
nes», 6 EJIL (1995), p. 260 at p. 263.
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29. On the other hand, it should al so be noted that the rejec-
tion of the Rome Statute by the United States does not affect the
principle of universality with regard to genocide. Although the
American Restatement of the Law68 is not a governmental act, it
widely reflects positions held by the United States Government.
In this regard, it is significant that § 404 of the Restatement men-
tions genocide as one of the offences for which universal jurisdic-
tion exists. Furthermore, reference should be made again to the
case of Demjanjuk69, where a United States court, i.e. an official
institution of the governmental apparatus, explicitly acknowledged
that any nation may seek to punish the perpetrators of that crime.
There are no clues indicating that the United States has changed
its position. Nor are there any indications suggesting that other
States have taken a restrictive stance concerning genocide.
30. In concluding this section, reference should finally be made
to the simple fact that genocide is the most horrendous of all crimes
under international law. As the ICJ pointed out in its legal opinion
of 28 May 1951, genocide «shocks the conscience of mankind»
and is «contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the
United Nations». From these propositions, the ICJ drew the con-
clusion that «the principles underlying the Convention are princi-
ples which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States,
even without any conventional obligation»70. Given the weight of
this statement, added to the existing practice, it can be safely said
that universal jurisdiction for the crime of genocide can be af-
firmed as a rule of positive international law.
31. It remains open, though, whether prosecution requires as a
minimum contact the presence of the alleged offender in the terri-
tory of the prosecuting State. If no such link is deemed to be re-
quired, issues of conflicting jurisdiction may arise. According to a
6 8 Op. cit. (supra note 7), p. 254.
6 9 Supra, note 61.
7 0 Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, ICJ Reports (1951) p. 15 at
23. It is well known that the Court has reaffirmed this proposition in recent
years, see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 Apri11993, ICJ
Reports (1993), p. 3 at p. 23 para. 49.
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judgment of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional of 13 December
2000 in the Guatemalan genocide case, a State not directly related
to an alleged crime of genocide is debarred by the principle of
subsidiarity from commencing criminal proceedings if the matter
is being actively pursued in the territorial State concerned71. This
principle was derived by the Court from Article VI of the Geno-
cide Convention in conjunction with the provision of the Rome
Statute (Artic1e 17) on the principle of complementarity. While
Artic1e VI of the Genocide Convention certainly cannot be relied
upon to support a rule of subsidiarity, since it deals with a different
issue, namely a possible duty to prosecute, the reference made to
Artic1e 17 of the Rome Statute is more pertinent. It could indeed
be maintained that States that hold jurisdiction according to the
c1assic principles of jurisdiction (territoriality, nationality etc.) should
enjoy priority for the investigation and prosecution of the relevant
facts. It does not seem to be unreasonable to grant a privileged
position to States which have suffered direct injury. On the other
hand, such arrangement should not favour impunity. Not infre-
quently, the authorities of the State having the closets links to the
offence refrain from seriously committing themselves to search-
ing for the truth and discharging their duties. The charges brought
in Spain against the major Guatemalan war criminals provide an
example in point. To date, more than three and a half years after
the publication of the report of the Commission for Historical Clari-
fication, no action has been taken in Guatemala against the al-
leged perpetrators of genocide.
2) Crimes Against Humanity
32. What has been said concerning genocide must not neces-
sarily apply to crimes against humanity as well. It is a notorious
fact that the class of «crimes against humanity» appeared for the
first time in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
7 1 Case 331/99. See on that judgment Michael Cottier, «What Relationship
Between the Exercise of Universal and Territorial Jurisdiction ?» The Decision
of 13 December 2000 of the Spanish National Court Shelving the Proceedings
Against Guatemalan Nationals Accused of Genocide», in Fischer et al. (eds.),
International and National Prosecution…, op. cit. (supra note 17), p. 843.
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Nuremberg (Artic1e 6 (2) c)). At that time, the list of such crimes
was relatively short. It read:
Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population, before or during the war ; or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not
in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Shortly afterwards, the Allied Control Council in Germany,
however, extended the list of the Nuremberg Charter. It enacted
Law No. 1072 with a view to creating a legal basis for the pros-
ecution in the respective zones of occupation of «war criminal s
and other similar offenders». In Article II (1) (c) of the Law, crimes
against humanity were defined as follows:
Atrocities and offenses, inc1uding but not limited to murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape,
or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not
in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.
It appears at first glance that three offences were added,
namely imprisonment, torture and rape. Substantively, these addi-
tions were not understood as an enlargement of the scope of crimes
against humanity, but rather as an illustration of «other inhumane
acts». Likewise, one cannot fail to note that the link with war
crimes or crimes against peace was severed.
33. Originally, the changes brought about by Control Council
Law No. 10 went largely unnoticed. It is the Nuremberg definition
of crimes against humanity which received the blessing of the UN
General Assembly by Resolution 95 (1) of 11 December 1946. Like-
wise, the ILC did not propose any material changes when, man-
dated by the General Assembly to prepare a codification of the
Nuremberg principles, it submitted the text of such a codification73.
7 2 Of 20 December 1945.
7 3 See Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, Principle VI (c), reprinted in
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It remained faithful to this cautious approach when in 1954 it pre-
sented the first version of its Code of Crimes against the Peace
and Security of Mankind (Article 2 (11))74.
34. In contradistinction to genocide, the definition of which
has remained stable over the years, due to its being rooted in the
Genocide Convention, the definition of crimes against humanity
has seen a dynamic development during the last decade. The ILC
departed from its original concept when in 1991, in a second at-
tempt to bring a Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security
of Mankind into being, it adopted a draft on first reading. This
draft mentioned murder, torture, establishing or maintaining over
persons a status of slavery, servitude or forced labour, persecution
on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds –if such
crimes were committed in a systematic manner or on a mass
scale– and deportation or forcible transfer of population (Article
21)75. The next step was the adoption of the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,76 which added
to the original list of 1945 imprisonment, torture and rape (Article
5), thereby reflecting the new elements introduced by Control
Counci1 Law No. 10 in 1945. Understandably, the list in the Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had to be
textually identical (Article 3)77. After the concept of crimes against
humanity had thus found renewed official recognition and had been
put into practice, the ILC also had to acknowledge that in the
perception of the international community the scope of the of-
fence had extended much beyond the limits as they were deline-
ated in the Nuremberg Charter. Consequently, distancing itself from
what it had suggested in 1991, and taking into account the atro-
cious experiences of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it now
carne up with a much longer list of criminal acts to be classified as
crimes against humanity. One finds as new entries in this list in
particular apartheid –defined as «institutionalised discrimination
UN (ed.), The Work of the lnternational Law Commission, 5th ed., New York
(1996), p. 167.
7 4 Reprinted ibid., p. 168.
7 5 Yearbook of the ILC 1991, Vol. II Part Two, p. 96.
7 6 Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), 27 May 1993.
7 7 Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), 8 November 1994.
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on racial, ethnic or religions grounds»– as well as forced disap-
pearance and enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse
(Article 18)78.
35. The latest definition of crimes against humanity can be
found in the Rome Statute (Article 7). Again the list has been
extended. It now comprises, in addition to what was already in-
cluded in the ILC Code of Crimes, forced pregnancy and enforced
sterilization, in particular. Instead of accepting the felicitous con-
cept of «institutionalised discrimination», the Rome Statute has
returned to the backward-oriented blunt term of apartheid which,
however, is defined as an «institutionalised regime of systematic
oppression and domination by one racial group over any other ra-
cial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintain-
ing that regime» (Article 7 (2) h)).
36. At Nuremberg, crimes against humanity were not an au-
tonomous class of crimes. The Charter of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal related them to war crimes or crimes against peace.
This legal connection was maintained in the Statute of the ICTY.
But one year later, when the Statute of the ICTR had to be pre-
pared, it was decided to sever this link which was deemed not to
correspond any more to the prevailing legal convictions. And in
fact, the jurisprudence of the ICTY has followed this interpreta-
tion79 which, furthermore, has now solid foundations. In the Rome
7 8 «A crime against humanity means any of the following acts, when cornmitted
in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a
Government or by any organization or group: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination;
(c) Torture; (d) Enslavement; (e) Persecution on political, racial, religious or
ethnic grounds; (f) Institutionalised discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious
grounds involving the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms
and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population; (g) Arbitrary
deportation or forcible transfer of population; (h) Arbitrary imprisonment;
(i) Forced disappearance of persons; G) Rape, enforced prostitution and
other forms of sexual abuse; (k) Other inhumane acts which severely damage
physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity, such as mutilation and
severe bodily harm» (see Yearbook of the lLC 1996, Vol. 11, Part Two, p. 47).
7 9 See the Tadic judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, 2 October 1995,
35 ILM (1996), p. 32 at p. 72 para. 141 ; see also judgment of the Appeals
Chamber, 14 January 2000, in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., para. 545.
145
Documentos
Statute, crimes against humanity stand on a par with genocide and
war crimes. In the legal literature, all voices agree to that «promo-
tion» of crimes against humanity.
37. Two different problems arise in connection with crimes
against humanity. The first question is whether individual criminal
responsibility does in fact exist for all the crimes encompassed in
the latest lists, the list enunciated in the Code of Crimes and the
list to be found in the Rome Statute. Whereas the acts and activi-
ties covered by the Nuremberg Charter do not seem open to any
doubt, all the later additions have to be scrutinized one by one as to
whether they form part of the body of general international law.
Apartheid, to take the most controversial offence, was not recog-
nized in the past as a crime against humanity by Western nations.
The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid80 has not received a single ratification
from the States of the Western group of States.
38. Even if it can be shown that a specific offence deserves to
be characterized as a crime against humanity, it is by no means
sure that it falls within the scope ratione materiae of universal
jurisdiction. No comprehensive answer can be given. As it emerges
from what was pointed out in the beginning of this note, the fact
that jurisdiction ratione materiae over these crimes is enjoyed by
the ICC is not tantamount to acknowledging universal jurisdiction.
What nations may safely entrust to an international tribunal is not
necessarily in good hands with domestic courts and tribunals.
However, regarding States parties to the Rome Statute the con-
siderations expounded in respect of genocide would appear to apply
: the principle of complementarity inherent in the Statute presup-
poses that the tribunal s of all States parties are in a position, as
agents of the system ushered in by the Statute, to take measures
of prosecution against anyone charged with having committed
crimes against humanity. This inference from the Rome Statute is
not opposable, however, to non-parties to the Statute. The exist-
ence of a general rule of international law would have to be proven




on the basis of general practice. While frequently UN General
Assembly Resolution 3074 (XXVIII) of 3 December 1973 is re-
lied upon as evidence supporting universal jurisdiction, careful pe-
rusal of the Resolution rather seems to confirm the contrary con-
clusion. In fact, the Resolution emphasizes the active personality
principle (op. para. 2) and recommends the territorial principle
(op. para. 5). If the drafters had been convinced of the applicabil-
ity of the principle of universal jurisdiction, they would not have
stressed these bases of jurisdiction which are more limited in scope
than universal jurisdiction.
39. Lastly, it should be noted that not every act that breaches
rules of conduct established by international law for individual s
constitutes a crime against humanity. Only clusters of crimes are
prosecutable as crimes under international law81. This is indicated
in the Statute of the ICTY (Article 5) somewhat discretely by the
words «directed against any civilian population» and is empha-
sized more visibly in the Statute of the ICTR by the phrase «when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
any civilian population» (Article 3). The 1996 final version of the
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind fol-
lows this line by underlining that an offence qualifies as a crime
against humanity only if it has been committed «in a systematic
manner or on a large scale». Apparently, the Rome Statute has
drawn its inspiration from this formula by stating that an offence
rises to the level of a crime against humanity if it has been perpe-
trated «as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population». It stands to reason why the international
community leaves it to individual States to prosecute isolated crimes.
Its interests are affected only if a pattern of breaches of the law
can be identified which amounts to an en-bloc rejection of stand-
ards of civilized behaviour.
8 1 See, in particular, the authoritative statement by 21 renowned human rights
lawyers in their «Memorandum of Law in Support of Concluding that
Apartheid is a Crime against Humanity under International Law», 20 Mich.
JIL (1999), p. 271 at pp. 283-284. For a different view see Flavia Lattanzi,
»Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunals», in Fischer et al. (eds), International and National
Prosecution…, op. cit. (supra note 17), p. 473 at pp. 478-482.
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40. For the purposes of enquiring whether the latest lists of
crimes against humanity are all based on general international law,
it would seem to be appropriate to distinguish between the differ-
ent elements of these lists. First of all, there are the crimes al-
ready considered to be indictable at the Nuremberg trial. The prac-
tice of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg has re-
ceived worldwide support. Nobody contends any more that the
convictions pronounced in Nuremberg were not based on solid
legal grounds. The precedent of Nuremberg was confirmed by
the establishment of the two international criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, and most recently by the es-
tablishment of the International Criminal Court. All the crimes
enunciated in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal appear also
in the statutes of the present-day international criminal tribunals.
Consequently, no reason can be perceived that would militate
against recognizing these core crimes as establishing individual
criminal responsibility as a matter of general international law.
41. The second group of offences comprises those which were
added in the Statutes of the two international tribunal s established
by the Security Council (ICTY and ICTR). Imprisonment, torture
and rape make up this second group. There can be no doubt that it
was the experiences of the wars in the former Yugoslavia which
prompted the UN Secretary-General, whose legal service drafted
the Statute, to make these additions. His report explicitly says so82.
As can be seen from that same report, the Secretary-General
was of the view that all the offences which he suggested should
be included in the Statute of the Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via were punishable under general international law83. Visibly, he
was of the view that «inhumane acts of extreme gravity» were all
covered by the somewhat general formula «other inhumane acts»
in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. This inference seems
entirely justified. Rightly, the ICTY and the ICTR have never had
any doubts that indeed all the acts falling within their jurisdiction
are based on general international law. The Security Council never
intended to create new criminal law. This would have exceeded
8 2 UN doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 48.
8 3 Ibid., para. 29.
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its powers ratione materiae. Second, any attempt to act as a
legislative body with a view to enacting new criminal law would
necessarily have failed since rules establishing specific acts as a
crime cannot have any retrospective effect. Any ex post facto
law would violate the guarantee of nullum crimen sine lege.
42. Concerning torture, in the Pinochet case none of the judges
rejected the proposition that torture was an international crime. But
there were differences of opinion regarding some important details.
Lord Goff of Chieveley pointed out that in any event until 1989 the
crime of torture was related to war crimes and did not, as such, qualify
as a crime against humanity84. But he does not seem to deny the fact
that a development has taken place since that time, changing the legal
position and freeing crimes against humanity generally from the for-
merly requisite link with war crimes. Thus, the current legal position
may be well captured in the words of Lord Millet according to whom«the
systematic use of torture on a large scale and as an instrument of
State policy» amounts to a crime against humanity85. As far as indi-
vidual, isolated acts of torture are concerned, they are certainly cov-
ered by the UN Torture Convention but do not come within the pur-
view of crimes against humanity under general international law.
43. Yet, the simple formula which equates the breach of a jus
cogens norm with universal jurisdiction86 was forcefully contested
by Lord Phillipps of Worth Matravers, who argued that universal
jurisdiction was generally introduced on the basis of specific con-
ventions, but not in a general fashion for broad categories of crimes
such as war crimes or crimes against humanity87. In such instances,
he said, States rather tend to agree, or to attempt to agree, on the
creation of international tribunals to try crimes which threaten the
foundations of the international community. The same position was
defended by a decision of the Tribunal de grande instance de
Paris of 6 May 199488. This word of caution stands against a
8 4 ILM 38 (1999), p. 595 at p. 599.
8 5 Ibid., p. 643 at p. 650.
8 6 See supra para. 18.
8 7 Ibid., p. 652 at p. 660.
8 8 Cited by Brigitte Stem, «La compétence universelle en France : le cas des crimes
commis en ex-Yougoslavie et au Rwanda». 40 GYIL (1997), p. 280 at p. 291.
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chorus of voices which all take it that universal jurisdiction exists
for all crimes against humanity, including torture89. In particular,
the International Law Association90 as well as the Princeton Prin-
ciples91 affirm the applicability of universal jurisdiction to crimes
against humanity, including torture.
44. As far as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy and enforced sterilization are concerned, no discussion
should be necessary. These crimes violate the most intimate sphere
of human integrity. There cannot be any doubt that they were
covered already by the Nuremberg Charter through the formula
«other inhumane acts». All these sexual abuses are designed to
deprive human beings of their dignity, to humiliate them and to
destroy their psychic balance, jeopardizing their survival as self-
reliant human persons. To make use of such strategies to fight,
subdue and possibly exterminate a specific group discredits a po-
litical regime and its leaders as an illegitimate gang deserving nei-
ther respect nor clemency. The international community has a vivid
interest in preventing offences of such brutality by establishing an
effective system of repression. In that regard, differences of opin-
ion concerning political, social or economic issues play no role
whatsoever. In any community which aspires to be admitted to a
world of peace and human rights, such crimes are proscribed and
perpetrators are threatened with severe penalties. No cultural di-
vide could ever explain or justify such egregious misdeeds. There-
fore, by accepting the assaults on the sexual integrity of human
persons listed in the Rome Statute as crimes against humanity
8 9 See Bassiouni, loc. cit. (supra note 20), p. 119 ; Antonio Cassese, International
Law, op cit. (supra note 33), p. 263; Joyner, loc. cit. (supra note 42), p. 160;
Kamminga, loc. cit. (supra note 3), p. 946 ; Robert Kolb, «Universal Criminal
Jurisdiction in Matters of International Terrorism: Some Reflections on Sta-
tus and Trends in Contemporary International Law», 50 Rev. hell. DI (1997),
p. 43 at p. 58; Judge Koroma, separate opinion in ICJ, Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), para. 9; Garth
Meintjes/Juan E. Méndez, «Reconciling Amnesties with Universal
Jurisdiction», 2 International Law Forum (2000), p. 76 at p. 80; Johan D.
van der Vyver, «Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court», 14 Emory ILR (2000), p. I at p. 2.
9 0 Loc. cit. (supra note 3), Conclusions and recommendations, 2, p. 423.
9 1 Op. cit. (supra note 5), Principle 2 (1), p. 29, explanations p. 47.
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entailing universal jurisdiction the international community does
not in any way open the doors to political manipulation.
45. Concerning forcible transfer of population, which is men-
tioned both in the ILC’s Code of Crimes (Article 18 (g))92 and the
Rome Statute (Article 7 (1) d))93, the international community has
for long periods taken an ambiguous stand. At the time when the
Nuremberg trial took place and indictments were formulated
against the leading Nazi war criminals on account of «deporta-
tion», the German population –millions of people– in the German
territories east of the Oder-Neisse line and in the Czechoslovak
region of the Sudeten as well as in other States of eastern Europe
were expelled. This action of ethnic cleansing, which received its
formal justification from the Potsdam Agreement of the four vic-
torious powers94, was widely considered as a legitimate act of
retribution against the German people. The foundation of the State
of Israel was accompanied by the flight and expulsion of huge
numbers of Palestinians from their ancestral lands. Here, the in-
ternational community reacted by asserting a right of return of the
displaced population95, but without making any demands that crimi-
nal prosecution be set in motion. The matter was viewed as a
purely humanitarian problem. Again, when Turkey expelled the
Greek population from the northern part of the island of Cyprus
after the invasion of its troops in 1974, the General Assembly
claimed a right of return96, but refrained from declaring that Tur-
9 2 For the commentary of the ILC on this provision see Year book of the ILC
1996, Vol. 11, Part Two, p. 49 para. 13. Its substance is extremely poor.
9 3 For the definition according to the elements of crime see Wiebke Rückert/
Georg Witschel, «Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity in the Elements
of Crime», in Fischer et al. (eds.), International and National Prosecution...,
op. cit. (supra note 17), p. 59 at p. 77.
9 4 Reprinted in Ingo von Münch, Dokumente ..., op cit. (supra note 18), p. 32
at p. 42: «Part XIII. Orderly Transfers of German Popu1ation... The three
Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognise
that the transfer to Germany of German popu1ations, or elements thereof,
remaining in Po1and, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken.
They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly
and humane manner».
9 5 General Assemb1y Resolution 194 (III), 11 December 1948.
9 6 General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX), 1 November 1974, op. para. 5;
Reso1ution 3395 (XXX), 20 November 1975, op. para. 6.
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key’s actions were punishable under general international law.
Hopefully, the prevailing opinio juris has changed. The events in
Yugoslavia have taught the world a bitter lesson. The expulsion of
ethnic Albanians from their homes in Kosovo prompted NATO
and its member States to launch a humanitarian intervention. All
this has now found its reflection in binding legal texts. The perfect
harmony between the Rome Statute and the ILC’s Code of Crimes
seems to confirm that ethnic cleansing is now regarded as a crime
which may not be justified under any circumstances. However, no
convictions have ever taken place under that heading97. It is clear
that any massive «resettlement» operation will have strong politi-
cal overtones. One may therefore doubt whether it is already pos-
sible to speak of a consolidated rule of positive international law,
no matter how important a prohibition to displace a population from
its ancestral lands may appear in fact. In any event, what may be
suitable for an indictment brought before the ICC is not necessar-
ily suitable for prosecution by domestic tribunals under the princi-
ple of universal jurisdiction.
46. Enforced disappearance is also a newcomer to the list of
crimes against humanity. The strategy of disappearances was in-
vented in Latin America during the fratricidal conflicts in the six-
ties and seventies of the last century. Dictatorial regimes often
abducted their political opponents, mostly killing them after a short
stage of applying torture to them, without however assuming re-
sponsibility for these measures. At the universal level, the General
Assembly stated in Resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992 that
the systematic practice of enforced disappearance «is of the na-
ture of a crime against humanity» (preamble, para. 4). Likewise,
the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of
Persons of 6 September 1994 sets forth in its preamble (para. 6)
that «the systematic practice of the forced disappearance of per-
sons constitutes a crime against humanity». Given the fact that
forced disappearance has become a synonym for indiscriminate
killing, being distinguished from other forms of systematic murder
9 7 In the practice of the ICTY, ethnic cleansing has generally been equated with
genocide, see John R.W.D. Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal




only by the veil of secrecy surrounding the crime, there can be no
doubt that forced disappearance was substantively covered al-
ready by the Nuremberg Charter. The existence of the prohibition
as a rule entailing international criminal responsibility is therefore
beyond any doubt.
47. Apartheid raises more difficult problems. There is no de-
nying the fact that the practice of apartheid in South Africa un-
der the white minority regime infringed basic human rights stand-
ards. In its advisory opinion of 1971, the International Court of
Justice stated :
To establish... and to enforce, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions
and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent
or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of fundamental
human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of
the Charter98.
But what is at stake here is not the lawfulness under interna-
tional law of a system of apartheid, but the issue of individual
criminal responsibility for participation in such a system. To pro-
scribe apartheid as a criminal practice was a step taken by the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid, adopted by the UN General Assembly as
Resolution 3068 (XXVIII) of 30 November 1973. In Artic1e 1 of
that Convention it is explicitly stated that «apartheid is a crime
against humanity». Furthermore, the Convention sets forth that
persons charged with committing the crime of apartheid «may
be tried by a competent tribunal of any State Party to the Conven-
tion» (Article V). However, the Convention, the adoption of which
occurred by a vote of 9l to 4, with 26 abstentions, was not well
received within the entire international community. As foreshad-
owed by the opposition of a large sector of States at the time of its
adoption, it was not able to attract any ratification from Western
countries. To date, among the 106 States parties (August 2002),
not a single State from Western Europe or North America can be
9 8 Legal consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), ICJ Reports (l971), p. 16 at p. 57 para. 131.
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found. This unwillingness to cooperate in a major project is not to
be explained by a tacit approval of the apartheid policies of the
then Government of South Africa. Such contention would funda-
mentally misjudge the real situation. The true reason is a different
one. The clause on participation and complicity (Artic1e III) was
framed so broadly that almost no white South African could es-
cape its reach and that even persons or undertakings just confin-
ing themselves to maintaining commercial relations with South
Africa could be charged with committing the crime of apartheid.
Indeed, attempts were made to enforce the alleged responsibility
of multinational enterprises which continued either their physical
presence in South Africa or their commercial ties with the coun-
try99, and the suits recently brought in the United States under the
ATCA against such undertakings again testify to the wide scope
of the Convention.
48. Given these circumstances, it is surprising to note that
apartheid now figures in Article 6 (1) G) of the Rome Statute. To
be sure, there may be substantive differences between apartheid
as described in Article 11 of the Apartheid Convention and apart-
heid as it is now defined in Artic1e 7 (2) (h) of the Rome Statute.
In both instances, the establishment of a system of racial discrimi-
nation is not sufficient; a broader context of serious human rights
violations is required. But there may be shades and nuances that
cannot be perceived at first glance. In any event, to accept apart-
heid as a crime against humanity does not correspond to the legal
position constantly defended by Western States. Of course, the
racial problems of South Africa have be en settled. But it is pre-
cisely South Africa which shows that to change a regime that
claims racial superiority requires a tremendous amount of efforts
and patience. South Africa could be brought back onto the way of
respecting human dignity and equality of all its citizens by a two-
track strategy applied by the international community of diplomatic
negotiations, on the one hand, and economic pressure, on the other.
As it appears, not a single South African of the white minority
9 9 In Resolution 1986/7, the UN Commission on Human Rights drew «the
attention of all States» to the opinion expressed by a group of experts («Group
of Three») that «transnational corporations operating in South Africa or Namibia
must be considered accomplices in the crime of apartheid» (op. cit. para. 8).
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Government was ever put on trial in other countries during the
apartheid period. On the contrary, the frontline States maintained
intensive economic relations with the apartheid regime, which
was indispensable for their own economic well-being. Judicial pros-
ecutions would not have promoted the goal of bringing down the
regime. And after the fall of the apartheid regime, the mandate
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was not to investigate
apartheid as such, but to clarify the crimes that had been com-
mitted under the defunct regime. Therefore, on the basis of the
available practice, it would be hard to conclude that a rule exists
under general international law which establishes apartheid as a
crime against humanity100. Consequently, there can be no ques-
tion of universal jurisdiction101. Of course, this appraisal of the
legal position is not tantamount to denying the criminal character
of all the features of an apartheid regime. Many of the elements
of the system as it was practiced in South Africa may well amount
to crimes against humanity.
49. Many authors hint that terrorism may be another crime
against humanity. But terrorism appears nowhere in the statutes
of the international criminal tribunals, nor has the last version of
the Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind
included the crime of terrorism. To be sure, the 1991 draft of such
100 Because of serious doubts regarding the status of apartheid under general
international law, Germany, in its Code of Crimes against International Law
(see infra, note 145), enacted it as a qualification of other –recognized–
crimes against humanity. In other words, the crime consists of committing a
crime against humanity with the intention of maintaining an institutionalised
system of oppression and racial domination [Artic1e 7 (5)].
101 Conc1usion supported by Higgins, op. cit. (supra note 19), p. 97 ; Christian
Tomuschat, «Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the
Recalcitrant Third State», in Yoram Dinstein/Mala Tabory (eds.), War Crimes
in International Law, The Hague et al. (1996) p. 41 at p. 56. Some voices,
however, recognize apartheid as a crime against humanity, see Bassiouni,
Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law, Dordrecht et al.
(1992), pp. 334-337; id., loc. cit. (supra note 20), pp. 122-123 (but referring
exc1usively to the Apartheid Convention, without seeking to prove that
apartheid is a crime under general international law); Randall, loc. cit. (supra
note 34), p. 821 ; Memorandum of 21 human rights lawyers, loc. cit. (supra
note 81). Significantly enough, the Princeton Principles (supra note 5)
characterize apartheid solely as a «candidate for inc1usion» (p. 48).
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a Code listed terrorism in Article 24102, but due to general uneasi-
ness with this proposal it was dropped. The reasons for the reluc-
tance to acknowledge terrorism as a crime against humanity are
easy to understand. To date, the international community has been
unable to produce a general treaty setting forth a definition of
terrorism and providing for measures to combat it. Instead, a piece-
meal approach was followed, States agreeing by treaty on spe-
cific forms of conduct which they all consider as harming the gen-
eral interest, like hijacking of aircraft103 and ships104, the taking of
hostages105, the placing of bombs106 or even the financing of ter-
rorism107. By contrast, endeavours to bring about a general con-
demnation of terrorism as a punishable crime have been unsuc-
cessful as yet108. Given the absence of a clear definition of terror-
ism109, it would be unreasonably bold to assert that terrorism con-
stitutes a crime against humanity under general international law.
102
 Yearbook of the ILC 1991, Vol. 11, Part Two, p. 97: «An individual who as an
agent or representative of a State commits or orders the commission of any of
the following acts:  undertaking, organizing, assisting, financing, encouraging
or tolerating acts against another State directed at persons or property and of
such a nature as to create a state of terror in the minds of public figures,
groups of persons or the general public, shall, on conviction thereof, be
sentenced...».
103 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 December
1970, 10 ILM (1971), 133; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 23 September 1971, 10 ILM (1971),
1151.
104 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, 10 March 1988, 27 ILM (1988), 668.
105 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by Gene-
ral Assembly Resolution 34/146, 17 December 1979.
106 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted
by General Assembly Resolution 52/164, 15 December 1997.
107 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
adopted by General Assembly Resolution 54/109,9 December 1999.
108 See General Assembly Resolution 56/88, Measures to eliminate international
terrorism, 12 December 2001, op. para. 7.
109 The best definition results from a combination of the International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (supra note 107), Article
2 (1) (b): «Any... act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act», and Gene-
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50. The conclusion to be drawn from the above considerations
is that some differentiation would appear to be necessary. It is dif-
ficult to argue convincingly that all the offences now listed in Article
7 of the Rome Statute give rise to universal jurisdiction. Direct at-
tacks on the life, the physical integrity and the dignity of human
beings can be classified more easily as crimes requiring a response
by every member of the international community than comprehen-
sive governmental policies that also affect the individual, but not in
the same direct way. It is obvious, too, that any appraisal of the legal
position involves a strong element of legal policy, given the fact, in
particular, that positive law is in a dynamic process of development
under the impact of the case law of the ICTY and the ICTR.
3) War Crimes
51. Universal jurisdiction for war crimes is firmly established
in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for «grave breaches».
According to the common clause of all four treaties (Articles 49,
50, 129, 146), States do not only have a right, but also a duty to
prosecute such breaches. Textually, the relevant clause reads as
follows:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search
for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be
committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it
prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation,
hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party
concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a
prima facie case.
ral Assembly Resolution 49/60, 9 December 1994, Declaration on measures
to e1iminate international terrorism, para. 3: «Criminal acts intended or
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of
persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance
unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical,
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to
justify them». This latter definition has been kept in all later Resolutions on
measures to eliminate terrorism.
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Given that the four Geneva Conventions have been ratified by
almost all States of the world, it would seem a natural conclusion
that universal jurisdiction constitutes at the same time a rule of
general international law. However, it is a matter of common knowl-
edge that before the outbreak of the armed conflict in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia, States made almost no use of those
clauses. No interest was shown in prosecuting crimes committed
abroad in conflicts between third States110. It is only since the
early nineties that tribunals of Western European States have from
time to time instituted proceedings against alleged perpetrators of
war crimes.
52. The scope ratione materiae of the grave-breaches clauses
of the four Geneva Conventions has been extended by Article 85
of Additional Protocol I of 1977. In that regard, one must take
note of the fact that, although the Protocol counts now not less
than 159 States parties and although the United Kingdom and
France have submitted their instruments of ratification (21 Janu-
ary 1998 and 11 April 2001 respectively), there still remains an
important bloc of outsiders. On the one hand, the United States
remains aloof from the new commitments introduced by Addi-
tional Protocol I, on the other hand there is a group of important
States from the Asian region which quite deliberately avoid to tie
their hands: India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel and Pakistan. It can
hardly be said that the absence of these countries does not affect
the evaluation of the position under general international law.
53. On the other hand, it should also be noted that in the same
way as the grave-breaches clauses of the four Conventions, Arti-
cle 85 goes beyond a pure recognition of universal jurisdiction by
setting forth a duty of prosecution. Hence, absence from the cir-
cle of States parties to Additional Protocol I does not necessarily
amount to rejection of universal jurisdiction for the grave breaches
listed in Article 85. The observer cannot fail to note, though, that
110 See Cassese, loc. cit. (supra note 37), p. 245, 250; separate opinion of Judges
Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Democratic Republic of the Congo V. Belgium), para. 32; Géraud de La
PradelIe, «La compétence universelle», in Hervé Ascensio et al. (eds.), Paris
(2000), p. 905 at p. 917 para. 43; Maison, loc. cit. (supra note 67).
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Article 85 encompasses two of the crimes the status of which is
controversial also under the rubric of crimes against humanity, namely
forced population movements by an occupying power (paragraph 4
(a)) as well as practices of apartheid (paragraph 4 (c)).
54. Lastly, as far as general international law is concerned, the
question must be put what could be the precise connotation of
universal jurisdiction for war crimes. This is largely a matter of
definition. Breaches of humanitarian law can be perpetrated at
four different levels of intensity. The lowest level is constituted by
violations of the rules of humanitarian law which do not qualify as
grave breaches («non-grave breaches»). At a second level, grave
breaches are to be assessed. At the third level, the additional cri-
teria of Article 8 of the Rome Statute could be applied, namely
war crimes «committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a
large-scale commission of such crimes». In the Statute of the
ICTY, Article 3 introduces a fourth category of war crimes with-
out any qualification. As a close reading of the different proposi-
tions of this Article reveals, they have as their common back-
ground the 1907 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land (Articles 23-28). Apparently, all of these offences
are deemed to bear the hallmark of particular seriousness. More
often than not, discourse on the principle of universal jurisdiction
confines itself to referring to «war crimes» without specifying what
is meant by that term111. However, one cannot avoid taking a clear
stand on this issue.
55. Given the fact that as a rule customary law remains below
the level of conventional law, it would seem to be fitting to exclude
the first category from the reach of universal jurisdiction. In fact,
by establishing the special class of «grave breaches», the interna-
tional community has made clear what the offences are in the
prosecution of which all States have a legitimate interest. «Sim-
ple» violations do not affect the bases of the international legal
order. It can and should be left to the States directly involved to
111 See, for instance, Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, «Crime in International Law:
Obligations Erga Omnes and the Duty to Prosecute», in id. Stefan Talmon
(eds.), The Reality of International Law. Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie,
Oxford (1999), p. 199 at p. 206, p. 213.
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take the necessary measures of repression. There is no practice
that would point to a different assessment of the legal position.
56. Regarding the clauses concerning grave breaches listed in
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the question whether they
qualify at the same time as roles of general international law is
fairly academic. As pointed out above, there exist good reasons
leading to doubts as to their customary crystallization. But the con-
ventional entitlement exists in any event. Although little attention
has been paid by States to their duty of prosecution, it has never
been alleged that on that ground desuetudo has come about. Thus,
the conclusion is straight : universal jurisdiction exists for all of the
offences enumerated in the gravebreaches clauses of these Con-
ventions, of course in the form provided for in the relevant texts,
i.e. that a territorial nexus (presence of the suspect in the national
territory) is required (jorum deprehensionis). As already pointed
out, some States, led by Belgium, have purported to exercise uni-
versal jurisdiction even without any territorial link to the alleged
offender. The lawfulness of that approach is debatable, given the
scarcity of practice in other countries.
57. Concerning the long lists of additional war crimes enunci-
ated in Article 8 (2) (b) of he Rome Statute («Other serious viola-
tions of the laws and customs applicable in international armed
conflict, within the established framework of international law,
namely, any of the following acts»), no clear answer could be
given. All of these crimes are under the jurisdiction of the ICC.
They have been drawn mainly from, on the one hand, Article 85
of Protocol I, and, on the other hand, the 1907 Hague Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Obviously,
the provisions on «attacks against personnel, installations, mate-
rial, units or vehic1es involved in a humanitarian assistance or
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations» (Artic1e 8 (2) (b) (iii)) does not have such a time-hon-
oured pedigree. The inc1usion of this provision in the Rome Stat-
ute occurred under the impact of the 1994 UN Convention on the
Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel112, a treaty
112 Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 49/59,9 December 1994.
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which to date has received only few ratifications. Here, no rule of
customary law can be deemed to exist. Comprehensively, it must
be repeated what was said in the beginning of this note, namely
that the jurisdiction of an international criminal tribunal must be
distinguished from universal jurisdiction. To be sure, as far as States
parties to the Rome Statute are concerned, it must be assumed
that they implicitly accepted universal jurisdiction as a corollary of
the centralized system of prosecution ushered in by the Statute.
Without the competence of domestic courts to take measures which
pave the way for the exercise by the ICC of its powers, the sys-
tem would be unworkable. But this applies only to States parties
to the Rome Statute and only for the purpose of facilitating the
discharge of its functions by the ICC. No third State is bound by a
convention to which it has not given its consent.
58. Lastly, the question arises whether universal jurisdiction
exists also for offences committed during internal armed conflict.
In 1949 and even in 1977, a clear distinction was drawn between
international armed conflict and internal armed conflict. While com-
mon Artic1e 3 of the four Geneva Conventions contains a set of
minimum guarantees applicable in internal armed conflict, it re-
frains from setting forth that breaches of these minimum stand-
ards would entail criminal responsibility. Likewise, Additional Pro-
tocol II of 1977, which amplified the protection provided to per-
sons involved in non-international conflicts, abstains from pronounc-
ing on the possible criminal consequences of breaches that may
be committed. It is well known that in this regard a quantum leap
forward occurred through the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the
Statute of the ICTR. Since, in particular, the conflict in Rwanda
was a conflict between two groups of the Rwandan population
without any direct external influence, it was important to establish
that breaches of the applicable rules committed during that con-
frontation were punishable war crimes. The Statute of the ICTR
made that determination. It provides in Article 4 that a number of
acts shall be punishable, namely all of the acts provided for in
Common Artic1e 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and in Article
4 (2) (a) of Additional Protocol II. This origin is also made clear in
the title of the relevant provision (Artic1e 4).
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59. Since, it should be recalled, the Security Council was not
empowered to enact new roles establishing international crimes,
the logical premise of Article 4 of the ICTR Statute was the rec-
ognition of violations of roles governing non international armed
conflict as punishable crimes under international law. The ICTR
was faced with this issue in its Akayesu judgment of 2 September
1998113. It held that indeed the acts falling within its jurisdiction
according to its Statute had a customary basis114. As for the rea-
sons supporting that conclusion, the judgment is not very rich in
substance.
60. However, the road to this conclusion had been paved three
years earlier by the judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY
in the Tadic case115. Referring to a large amount of international
practice, the Chamber pointed out that humanitarian law had not
only evolved to cover internal conflicts, but that the international
community did indeed consider any breaches of these rules as
entailing individual criminal responsibility116. This may have been
a somewhat surprising judicial finding at the time when it was
made. In the meantime, however, it has guided the practice of the
two international criminal tribunals, it has been widely acclaimed
by the legal literature117 and it has al so shaped the jurisdictional
provisions of the Rome Statute, where extensive lists of crimes
susceptible of being committed in non-international conflicts (Ar-
ticle 8 (2) (c) and (e)) follow the lists established for crimes oc-
curring in international conflicts (Article 8 (2) (a) and (b)). It may
therefore safely be assumed that grave violations of the rules gov-
erning internal armed conflict constitute crimes under international
law the prosecution of which is in keeping with the rule of law.
113 Summary of the judgment in 37 ILM (1998), p. 1399; full text available at
www.ictr.org/.
114 For extracts from the relevant passages (paras. 610-617) see Jones, op. cit.
(supra note 97), pp. 496-497.
115 Judgment of 2 October 1995, 35 ILM (1996), p. 32.
116 Ibid., pp. 70-71, paras. 128-136.
117 One ofthe leading advocates in this respect was Theodor Meron, «International
Criminalization of Internal Atrocities», 89 AJIL (1995), pp. 554 ff., in parti-
cular 559568. See now the weighty Memorandum of 21 renowned scholars,
loc. cit. (supra note 81), p. 275, pp. 286-288.
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61. This conclusion is not tantamount to saying that universal
jurisdiction exists with regard to such crimes. Whenever an armed
conflict has torn the social fabric of a given human community,
strenuous efforts must be undertaken with a view to re-establish-
ing a sense of national unity and solidarity. Primarily, the burden of
national reconciliation rests on the shoulders of the affected popu-
lation itself. While genocide and crimes against humanity entail
criminal responsibility coupled with universal jurisdiction without
any regard for the place of their commission or the nationality of
the victims, the law of armed conflict has always insisted on the
necessity of distinguishing between internal and international con-
flicts. Even if this distinction has now become moot on the level of
substantive law, one should hesitate before casting it aside on the
procedural level. Several reasons militate against equating crimes
committed in internal conflict with crimes committed in interna-
tional conflict. First, international practice does not confirm that
equation. There is no evidence demonstrating that States have
shown the same interest in prosecuting grave breaches of the rules
governing internal conflict as grave breaches of the regime of
international armed conflict. Second, as pointed out above, nations
themselves must be granted a decisive voice in determining how
to deal with a national cataclysm. Many States have set up special
mechanisms, in particular truth commissions, because it would
exceed their moral and physical capacity to prosecute all of the
crimes which were perpetrated during such a period of lawless-
ness. Not infrequently, amnesties are granted. Thus, processes of
national healing are promoted by measures of forgiveness. To
enable any tribunal of any third State to intervene in this process
would have extremely harmful effects. Given the fact that any
judgment on the existence of universal jurisdiction presupposes a
careful balancing of the interests at stake, the conclusion seems
unavoidable that universal jurisdiction should be denied. The prin-
ciple of national self-determination prevails. Nations themselves
should decide how best to deal with their past as far as war crimes
committed in internal conflict are concerned118.
118 For a different assessment see Meron, loc. cit. (supra note 117), p. 569.
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62. This conclusion is also corroborated by Article 6 (5) of
Protocol II which provides:
At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour
to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have
participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for
reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or
detained.
It may well be that the original purpose of this provision is a
fairly limited one. It has been suggested that it is a recommenda-
tion to governments not to punish anyone solely because of his
participation in a civil war («combatant immunity»), and that the
«amnesty» explicitly mentioned does not refer to crimes commit-
ted during the conflict119. Nevertheless, Article 6 (5) reflects the
need to rebuild a society ravaged by civil war. It shows that the
drafters were sensible to the needs of a nation seeking to find a
new mutuality of understanding after a temporary break-up of
internal cohesion. Thus, Article 6 (5) lends support to the proposi-
tion that third countries should not interfere with internal proc-
esses of societal accommodation.
D. AMNESTIES AND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
63. The above considerations raise the general issue of amnes-
ties, not only in the context of war crimes, but generally with regard
to international crimes. It is easy to take a rigid view of the effect of
amnesties, arguing that since international crimes are detrimental to
the interests of mankind as a whole, amnesties granted single-
handedly by one nation are irrelevant and cannot stop prosecution
by the tribunals of another State. From a purely dogmatic viewpoint,
this inference sounds convincing and irrefutable. In practice, how-
ever, the legal position seems to be somewhat more complex.
64. First of all, a distinction should be drawn between instances,
on the one hand, where crimes were committed exclusively within
119 See N. Roht-Arriaza/L. Gibson, «The Developing Jurisprudence on
Amnesty», 20 Human Rights Quarterly (1998), p. 843 at p. 865.
164
Documentos
a national framework, in the national territory, all of the victims
being nationals of the country concerned, and instances, on the
other hand, where third States were substantively affected, either
because the crime or its effects occurred/were felt within their ter-
ritories, or because the crime caused injury to their nationals. It
would seem to be obvious that no State can unilaterally deprive
other States of a jurisdictional right which they hold under general
international law to institute criminal proceedings against a given
individual alleged to have committed an international crime. Under
such circumstances, third States do not act as guardians of interna-
tional legality, but as defenders of their own individual interests.
65. The situation is totally different when universal jurisdiction
serves as an instrument for the protection of the foundations of
the international legal order, which is the typical configuration for
its exercise. Here, the interests of the national community directly
concerned should be respected as a paramount consideration.
Through an amnesty, a people may express its will to settle the
consequences of a criminal past in a specific manner, in any event
not by criminal prosecution. However, this wish must be genuine.
If a dictatorial regime just before renouncing power and re-admit-
ting democratic elections fabricates an amnesty for its representa-
tives, there is no ground for other nations or for the institutions of
the international community to comply with such an act imposed
on the population concerned. On the other hand, if, like in South
Africa, a comprehensive system is established for dealing with
the past, under which an amnesty presupposes open admission of
the offences committed in the past, which means that the perpe-
trators will in the future suffer social reprimand and isolation, third
States should have no right to overturn this system by initiating
criminal proceedings against the offenders on the basis of their
admissions. The debate is not closed on this issue120. A particu-
120 Advocating the relevance of amnesties: John Dugard, «Dealing with Crimes
of a Past Regime. Is Amnesty Still an Option?», 12 Leiden JIL (1999), p.
1001 at p. 1009; Christian Tomuschat, «The Duty to Prosecute International
Crimes Committed by Individuals», in Tradition und Weltoffenheit des Rechts.
Festschrift für Helmut Steinberger, Berlin et al. (2002), p. 315 at p. 347; Ruth
Wedgwood, «The International Criminal Court : An American View», 10
EJIL (I999), p. 93 at p. 96.
165
Documentos
larly elegant solution was found in Guatemala in 1996. By virtue
of the Law on National Reconciliation, an amnesty was granted
for all offences committed during the armed confrontation, except
for offences in violation of rules of international law. Because of
the weakness of the entire judicial system, however, this rule pro-
viding for the prosecution of breaches of international law, in par-
ticular genocide, has remained a dead letter. No durable peace be-
tween Israel and Palestine will be possible without generous am-
nesty clauses in a future peace settlement. Both sides could almost
ad infinitum argue that war crimes were committed by certain
elements of the other side. Leaving prosecution to the authorities of
the alleged offender concerned would certainly be the best solution.
The exercise of universal jurisdiction by the tribunals of third States,
on the other hand, could wreak havoc to the peace process.
66. An amnesty shielding an individual from prosecution by
the tribunals of another State is not the same as an amnesty de-
signed to prevent prosecution by an international tribunal. For this
reason, the findings of the ICTY in the case of Furundzija121 as
well as the findings of the Inter-American Court of Human Right
in Barrios Altos122 to the effect that amnesties in instances of
torture are invalid cannot be applied directly to the problématique
discussed here. Both tribunals made their rulings from the view-
point of the organized international community, and what they said
about the effect of an amnesty on the jurisdiction of the domestic
courts of other States must be viewed as obiter dictum.
66. Statutes of limitation are closely connected with the issue
of amnesties. The Rome Statute has taken a rigid stance by pro-
viding that the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC shall not be
subject to any such limitation (Article 29). Again, one may doubt
whether this stance corresponds to the lessons to be drawn from
a review of international practice. Henry Kissinger, in his attack
on the principle of universal jurisdiction, reminded his readers that
Spain, which was so adamant in urging the United Kingdom to
extradite ex-President Pinochet of Chile, had deliberately abstained
121 Judgment of 10 December 1998,38 ILM (1999), p. 317 at p. 349, para. 155.
122 Judgment of 14 March 2001, paras. 41-44.
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from conducting any trials on account of the atrocities committed
during its civil war123. Obviously, the Spanish authorities acted
according to the leitmotiv: Let bygones be bygones. At Nurem-
berg, the issue of a possible statute of limitations played no role.
All of the crimes constituting the object of the indictments were
still fresh. The later instruments abstained from making any deter-
mination on the issue. In 1968, however, the UN General Assem-
bly adopted a Convention on the Non Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity124. This
Convention has not been too well received by the international
community. On 31 August 2002, after almost 34 years of exist-
ence, it counted no more than 45 States parties, among which not
a single one belonged to the (former) Western group. One of the
main grounds for the widespread opposition against the instru-
ment was its retroactive character125. But also a parallel Euro-
pean treaty, the European Convention on the Non Applicability of
Statutory Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes
of 1974, which has eschewed the defect of retrospectivity, has been
absolutely unsuccessful. More than 28 years after its opening for
signature, it has received just two ratifications (Netherlands, Roma-
nia) and has not entered into force. This is a clear vote against the
idea of a never-ending right of prosecution. Furthermore, judicial
practice is extremely rare. Reference can be made only to the de-
cision of the French Cour de cassation which, in the Barbie case,
held that crimes against humanity are «imprescriptibles»126. Given
the inconsistent practice, it must be concluded that no firm rule ex-
ists127. A young author, Micaela Frulli, has recently suggested that
«une regle de droit international général sur l’imprescriptibilité... est
en train de formation ou de consolidation»128, but her conclusions
123 Loc. cit. (supra note 49), 91.
124 Resolution 2391 (XXIII), 26 November 1968.
125 Article 1: «No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes,
irrespective of the date o their commission».
126 90 RGDIP (1986), p. 1023 at p. 1024.
127 The explanations to the Princeton Principles (supra note 5), p. 51, are misleading
in that they refer to the two conventions considered above without mentioning
that they have clearly been rejected by the vast majority of their addressees.
128 «Le droit international et les obstacles à la mise en oeuvre de la responsabilité
pénale pour crimes internationaux», in Crimes internationaux et juridictions
nationale, op. cit. (supra note 16), p. 215 at p. 240.
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are largely based on Article 29 of the Rome Statute and hence do
not point to a general opinio juris or a general practice, given the
fierce resistance which currently the Rome Statute encounters.
As long as it cannot be proven that the exclusion of statutory limi-
tation is grounded on a rule of general international law, third States
would have to respect the application of such limitations by the
States having a direct link to the crimes concerned according to
one of the traditional principles of jurisdiction.
67. Although the Genocide Convention remains silent on the
issue of statutory limitation, it is fairly certain that the abhorrence
of the international community regarding genocide is such that an
alleged suspect would never be heard with the argument that his/
her prosecution cannot take place any longer according to law.
The same might be true of instances of allegations that crimes
against humanity have been committed. Concerning war crimes,
the picture might be a different one, contrary to the determination
of the Rome Statute that genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes should all be treated in the same fashion. Especially in
respect of situations of armed conflict, the evidentiary problems
will normally rise to unmanageable dimensions already after a few
years’ time. Just for reasons of legal security, it would certainly be
wise to recognize a time limit of a maximum of 30 years. It seems
unfortunate that at the Rome Conference of 1998 the good inten-
tions pushed away any other consideration. Currently, in any event,
reflection on the pros and cons of Article 29 of the Rome Statute
remains a matter of speculation since the true test for the rule
enunciated therein will come not earlier than 30 years from now.
68. Universal jurisdiction can lead to many conflicts between
and among States wishing to prosecute an alleged offender. To
the extent that absolute universal jurisdiction is recognized as ad-
missible under general international law, some coordination would
be necessary. In particular, the question whether the State of the
commission of the crime or the State of nationality of the suspect
enjoys some kind of priority would have to be dealt with (first right
of prosecution)129. In any event, the State of custody or of sojourn
129 In its judgment of 13 December 2000 in the Guatemalan genocide case the
Spanish Audiencia Nacional held that indeed, according to Article VI of the
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of the alleged offender may receive requests for extradition from
different States. In such circumstances, it must give precedence
to one of the requesting States. It does not seem possible to estab-
lish, in an abstract fashion a priori, a hierarchy of general appli-
cability. Conflicts will have to be settled ad hoc. Of course, the
State of custody must act in good faith in appraising the different
claims it has to face. But it does not appear that it must meet any
further requirements.
E. PROVISIONAL CONCLUSION
69. It has been attempted to submit basic elements of infor-
mation in order to stimulate debate in the Commission. On many
issues, choices will have to be made. The Commission will have to
decide whether it wishes to codify the existing law or whether it
wishes to make a contribution to the (progressive) development of
the law. By opting for the first alternative, it may risk to be quickly
overtaken by events, in particular through the case law of the
existing international criminal tribunals. On the other hand, by
moving ahead too rapidly, the Commission might create grave dan-
gers for legal certainty and security. Both the needs of the inter-
national community in combating crimes under international law
and the legitimate needs of the same international community for
respect of sovereign equality of States and protection of the rights
of alleged offenders must be assessed and brought into a fair bal-
ance. It is therefore extremely difficult to distinguish between the
ius conditum and the ius condendum. Once the ICC will have
taken up its activity, many issues will appear in a new light. This
should not, however, deter the Institute from expressing its views
on what the essential features of an equitable regime should be.
Genocide Convention, the territorial State holds a preferential title to
prosecution, see below text accompanying note 153.
